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Abstract: Based on signalling theory, Posner (1998, 2000) suggests that seemingly irrational behaviour
or social norms emerge because they help to distinguish agents who prefer to engage in repeated
cooperative interactions (long-term types) from agents with immediate non-cooperative incentives
(short-term types). In this article, we formalize Posner’s theory in a signalling trust game, derive
hypotheses from our model, and test them empirically in a series of laboratory experiments in the
United Kingdom, Russia, and Switzerland. Our results are surprisingly robust across the three countries
and in line with most of our hypotheses. However, contrary to our main hypothesis, the introduction of
a signalling opportunity does not increase the overall level of trust in our experiments and even reduces
it under certain conditions. We argue that this is due to a high proportion of short-term types
honouring trust because of non-selfish motives. Our results show that if a priori levels of trust and
trustworthiness are high, introducing a signalling opportunity that is meant to distinguish long-term
and short-term types may have a counterproductive effect.
Introduction
Trust is an indispensable ingredient in cooperative social
interactions. In everyday life, people trust each other
even though such trust could be abused without any
consequences for the person trusted (the trustee) and
even though the person trusting (the truster) could incur
considerable losses. Buying a used car, employing
someone, falling in love, or paying a bribe are all
examples of actions taken in the hope of mutual benefit
but with the risk that the other party might have
sufficient incentive to abuse the trust. The car dealer
could sell you a lemon, an employee could quit after
receiving valuable on-the-job training, a lover could
steal away after one night, and the person who has taken
the bribe could keep the money and provide no
reciprocal service. If the truster fears that the trustee is
going to abuse the trust, he or she will not trust in the
first place.
Trust and Uncertainty
Trust problems arise in sequential exchanges when the
first mover, the truster, is uncertain about whether his or
her utility transfer will be reciprocated by the second
mover, the trustee. The exchange is not based on a
formally binding agreement, and so a self-interested
trustee has an incentive not to reciprocate. If the stakes
are too high, the truster prefers not to place trust and
both actors are worse off than if trust was given and
honoured (Coleman, 1990).
The truster’s uncertainty about whether the trustee is
trustworthy follows from the assumption that trustees
differ in the preferences and constraints that shape their
incentives in the interaction (Riegelsberger, Sasse, and
McCarthy (2005) distinguish between intrinsic and
contextual trust-warranting properties). First, a trustee
could have restrictive preferences. He or she might have
the opportunity, but not the desire, to abuse trust.
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A trustee might prefer to be honest because of
internalized norms of reciprocity and fairness (Voss,
1998; Bacharach and Gambetta, 2001) or because he or
she would feel guilty for abusing the truster’s trust
(Braun, 1992; Snijders, 1996). Second, the trustee could
be constrained by the structure of the interaction. In
other words, either he or she might not have the option
of abusing trust (Raub, 2004) or the payoffs might not
provide sufficient incentive (Camerer and Weigelt,
1988). Third, a trustee could be concerned about the
consequences in terms of his or her reputation in regard
to the decision to abuse trust. Such social constraints
result from the trustee’s social embeddedness (Hardin,
1996; Cook and Hardin, 2001; Buskens and Raub, 2002).
A related argument suggested by Posner (1998, 2000)
is that trustees differ in terms of their discount factors,
i.e., their probability of engaging repeatedly in coopera-
tive interactions. In the simplest case, long-term types
have high discount factors, and therefore a large ‘shadow
of the future’ (Axelrod, 1984), and short-term types
have low discount factors and thus immediate non-
cooperative incentives. As discount factors are unobserv-
able traits, there is uncertainty on the part of the truster
about a potential trustee’s type.
Signalling Trustworthiness
A truster benefits from knowing who to trust and to
distrust, while a trustee benefits from being trusted
(irrespective of his or her type). Thus, honest and
dishonest trustees have an incentive to offer credible
information about their trustworthiness (i.e., about their
trustworthy-making preferences and constraints) or to
convey a false impression of this, respectively. The
question is how such information allows a truster to
discriminate between the trustworthy type and the mimic.
Signalling theory (Spence, 1973; Voss, 1998; Bacharach
and Gambetta, 2001; Raub, 2004) provides an answer.
‘Signals’ can be thought of as agents’ observable actions
conveying relevant information in a social interaction.
The main tenets of signalling theory are as follows (see
also Bliege Bird and Smith, 2005). First, individuals
differ in the preferences and constraints determining
their decisions in social interactions. Second, these
preferences and constraints are only imperfectly observ-
able, but are correlated with signalling costs and/or
benefits such that certain individuals cannot afford to
send signals at all, or only to a lesser extent (Johnstone,
1997; Gambetta, 2009). Third, individuals benefit from
adequate information about their interaction partner’s
preferences and constraints. Finally, signals allow indi-
viduals to make inferences about these preferences and
constraints, thereby reducing uncertainty.
For instance, a used car dealer selling lemons
(unknown to the buyer) cannot afford to give a three-
year guarantee to the buyer, a fresh employee already
looking out for another job (unknown to the employer)
will not bother to move near the employer’s place of
work, and a producer of low-quality goods (unknown to
the consumer) will not spend money on advertising as
dissatisfied consumers will not consider a second pur-
chase (Nelson, 1974).
The last two examples are paradigmatic for Posner’s
idea that costly signals are indicative of agents’ under-
lying discount factors. Both the committed employee as
well as the high-quality producer are long-term types
and thus have high discount factors. The former signals
his or her ‘long-term-ness’ by incurring the potential
costs of a removal, the latter by investing in his or her
reputation through costly advertising. But Posner’s
theory goes a step further. It suggests that social norms
are the equilibrium outcomes of such signalling games
and adherence to social norms is a credible signal of
one’s long-term interest in cooperative relations. We
expand on this idea in more detail elsewhere (Diekmann
and Przepiorka, 2010). In this article, we focus on
Posner’s theory as suggesting that agents’ temporal
embeddedness is a trustworthy-making property that
can be credibly signalled in social interactions when trust
is at stake. The main question we want to answer here is
whether long-term types invest in costly signals more
and therefore are trusted more than short-term types
and whether introducing a signalling opportunity in-
creases the overall level of trust and collective gains.
Experimental Evidence
To our knowledge, the only laboratory experiment with
trust games and costly signals as a commitment device
was conducted by Bolle and Kaehler (2007) (for other
experiments on trust and commitments see, for example,
Snijders and Buskens, 2001; Charness and Dufwenberg,
2006; Vieth, 2009). In their experiment, an ‘honest’
trustee gains from honouring a truster’s trust, whereas a
‘dishonest’ trustee gains from abusing it. Subjects in the
role of a truster cannot tell who is who, but they know
that they will meet an honest trustee with probability .
Given  and the possible payoffs from an interaction
with either type, a rational and self-interested truster will
decide whether to place trust based on the expected
payoffs from either action. To be more precise, a
theoretical threshold value * exists at which the
expected payoffs from either of the truster’s actions are
equal and the truster is indifferent with regard to placing
and not placing trust. In their experiment, Bolle and
Kaehler (2007) vary . In one condition (low-alpha),  is
TEMPORAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND SIGNALS OF TRUSTWORTHINESS 1011
below * and the truster has a higher expected payoff
from not placing trust. In the other condition (high-
alpha),  is above * and the truster has a higher
expected payoff from placing trust.
In both conditions, the trustees are given the oppor-
tunity to signal their trustworthiness by making a costly
gift to the truster before the truster decides whether to
place trust. If the trustee decides to make a gift, he or
she incurs the costs irrespective of what the truster does
thereafter. The costs of the gift are such that even if the
truster placed trust after receiving it, a dishonest trustee
would not gain from having the opportunity to abuse
that trust, whereas an honest trustee would still gain
from honouring it. In other words, the signal is type-
separating because only the honest trustee can afford to
send it.
Such a signalling opportunity creates the conditions
for a so-called ‘separating equilibrium’ in which the
honest trustee sends a gift, a dishonest trustee does not
(i.e., type-separating behaviour), and the truster places
trust only if he or she has received a gift. Obviously, the
truster would benefit from knowing who to trust and
who to distrust in both the low-alpha and the high-alpha
condition. However, a separating equilibrium is more
likely to emerge in the low-alpha condition than in the
high-alpha condition because in the former, it is
beneficial for the honest trustee to send a gift to be
trusted, whereas in the latter, the truster is expected to
place trust anyway and, therefore, the honest trustee can
save the costs of a gift. In the high-alpha condition, it is
therefore more likely that a so-called ‘pooling equilib-
rium’ emerges in which no trustee sends a gift
(i.e., type-pooling behaviour). Although their results
did not perfectly align with these theoretical predictions,
the results were relatively close.
Unlike in Bolle and Kaehler’s experiment, the actors in
our model are not distinguished by their payoffs in
the trust game but by their discount factors, i.e., by the
expected number of trust games they can engage in. We
outline our model in the next section.
The Game Theoretic Model and
Hypotheses
The signalling model described in this section involves a
binary trust game (Dasgupta, 1988; Kreps, 1990), with
the trustee holding private information about his or her
type (i.e., a trust game with incomplete information: see
Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Dasgupta, 1988; Voss, 1998;
Buskens, 1999; Bacharach and Gambetta, 2001; Raub,
2004). In previous signalling models, which are based on
the trust game with incomplete information, trustees’
types differ either in the possibility or the immediate
monetary incentives to abuse a truster’s trust (Bacharach
and Gambetta, 2001; Raub, 2004; Ahn and Esarey, 2008).
Posner (1998, 2000) was the first to suggest that trustees
can be distinguished based on their discount factors and
he outlines the conditions for a separating equilibrium in
a numerical example (Posner, 1998). However Posner’s
theory has been criticized on the grounds that it is
difficult to prove empirically because potentially any
time-, money-, or energy-consuming behaviour could
serve as a signal (McAdams, 2001). To our knowledge,
the model devised in this piece and the extended analysis
contained in the online Supplementary Data 1 is the first
attempt to formalize Posner’s idea in game theoretic
terms. We think that a formalized theory is more precise
and allows hypotheses to be derived that can be tested
empirically. Note, moreover, that our model is not
restricted to cases in which trustees differ in terms of
their discount factors; it can be equally applied to all
cases in which one type of trustee prefers or is restricted
to abuse the trust placed by a truster and another type of
trustee prefers or is restricted to honour that trust. In the
section ‘Trust and Uncertainty’, we listed several other
reasons why trustees can differ in the preferences and
constraints that shape their incentives to honour or
abuse a truster’s trust.
Binary Trust Game
The binary trust game (Figure 1) represents a social
dilemma that cannot be overcome by rational players.
While it is rational for the truster not to place trust, both
the truster and the trustee would be better off if trust
was placed and honoured.
However, the assumption that trustees always abuse
trust is neither realistic nor useful. If trusters were
certain about the trustworthiness of trustees, the notion
of trust would be superfluous. The trust problem arises
from a truster’s uncertainty about a trustee’s preferences
and constraints, which determine their decisions in an
interaction. In the model presented here, we assume two
types of trustees who differ in their discount factors and
can be characterized as either long term or short term
(Posner, 1998, 2000). A discount factor stands for a
trustee’s probability of engaging in another interaction
with the truster, but it can also be interpreted as the
trustee’s time preference.1 Given a long-term trustee’s
discount factor (l), he or she strictly prefers to engage in
repeated interactions with a truster over a one-time
abuse of trust [i.e., R/(1 – l) >T>P].
2 On the other
hand, given a short-term trustee’s discount factor (s),
the expected payoff from repeated interactions with a
truster is strictly smaller than his or her payoff from a
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one-time abuse of trust [i.e., T>R/(1 – s) >P]. The
long-term and the short-term trustee differ, if their
discount factors differ, such that
l >
T  R
T
> s ð1Þ
Note that an implicit assumption of our model is that an
interaction between a truster and a trustee ends if the
truster does not place trust or the trustee abuses placed
trust.3 This assumption implies that only the long-term
trustee will be deterred from abusing a truster’s trust, as
he or she would otherwise forgo the higher future
benefits from a cooperative repeated interaction with the
truster. The short-term trustee’s potential future benefits
from a repeated interaction with the truster are too small
for him or her to resist the temptation of abusing the
truster’s trust right away.
Trust Game with Incomplete Information
A truster’s uncertainty about a trustee’s type can be
accounted for in the trust game with incomplete
information (Figure 2). Given the probability  to
meet a long-term trustee and the payoff structure, a
truster only trusts if the expected payoff from trusting is
higher than the payoff from not doing so. That is, if
R
1
1 l þ 1 ð ÞS > P ð2Þ
After solving Equation 2 for , it can be shown that a
truster will abstain from placing trust if  is less than the
threshold value *,4 where
* ¼ P  Sð Þð1 lÞ
R Sð1 lÞ ð3Þ
Under these conditions, the truster and the long-term
trustee could attain a more beneficial outcome if the
trustee were able to communicate his or her type
credibly.
Signalling Trust Game
The model can be extended so that the trustee can
initially choose whether to send a signal at cost c
(Figure 3). For the truster to interpret the trustee’s type,
the signal must be type-separating. Then, a separating
equilibrium can emerge in which the long-term trustee
sends a signal, a short-term trustee does not (i.e.,
type-separating behaviour), and the truster places trust
Figure 2 In the trust game with incomplete information,
Nature (N) moves first and determines the trustee’s type to
be either long term or short term with probability  or 1 – ,
respectively. The probability  is common knowledge and the
fact that the truster does not know who is who, is denoted
by the dashed line. If the truster places trust, the long-term
trustee honours trust, whereas a short-term trustee does not
do so with certainty. In the first case, the truster receives
payoff R/(1 – l); in the second case, the truster’s payoff is S.
The truster prefers placing trust if the trustee is a long-term
type over not placing trust at all and is most reluctant to trust
a short-term trustee (i.e., R/(1 – l) > P> S).
Figure 1 In the binary trust game, the truster (player 1) first
decides whether to place trust (t) or not to place trust (:t). If
the truster decides not to place trust, the interaction is
terminated and both parties receive payoff P. If, instead, the
truster decides to trust, it is the trustee’s turn (player 2) to
choose whether or not to honour that trust (h or :h). If the
trustee honours the trust, both players receive payoff R. If
the trustee does not honour the trust, the trustee receives
payoff T while the truster receives S. The payoffs are ordered
so that that the trustee abuses trust if the truster places it
(i.e., T > R> P) and the truster prefers not to place trust rather
than find his or her trust abused (i.e., R > P> S). The letters T,
R, P, S stand for Temptation, Reward, Punishment, and
Sucker’s Payoff, respectively, and are commonly used to
denote payoffs in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game. Unless
stated otherwise, payoffs are assumed to correspond to
players’ utilities.
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only if a signal has been sent by the trustee. The signal is
type-separating if the long-term trustee can afford to
send it while the short-term trustee cannot. That is, if
R
1
1 l  P > c > T  P ð4Þ
If <*, the separating equilibrium is collectively more
beneficial than the equilibrium without a signalling
opportunity. That is, if signalling is not possible, trusters
will abstain from placing trust and all will receive payoff
P. In the former case, however, trusters’ expected payoff
is R/(1 – l)þ (1 –)P and trustees receive [R/(1 – l) –
c]þ (1 – )P. If > *, a separating equilibrium can also
emerge but does not improve collective gains (i.e., the
sum of trusters’ and trustees’ expected payoffs). Without
a signalling opportunity, trusters will always place trust
and their expected payoff is R/(1 – l)þ (1 – )S, with
trustees receiving [R/(1 – l)]þ (1 – )T. It can be
shown that these collective gains are always larger than
the collective gains in the separating equilibrium, if
c>T –P. In other words, if > *, a pooling equilib-
rium, where both trustee types do not send signals (i.e.,
type-pooling behaviour) and trusters always place trust,
is collectively more beneficial.
Hypotheses
The signalling trust game has three stages at which
trusters or trustees have to make decisions (see Figure 3).
Hypotheses are derived from the game theoretic model
for all three decision stages: (i) the trustee’s signalling
decision conditional on the trustee’s type, (ii) the
truster’s decision conditional on the trustee’s signalling
opportunity and the trustee’s signal, and (iii) the
trustee’s decision to cooperate or to defect conditional
on the trustee’s type.
Note that the game theoretic model devised above
implies a binary signalling decision, whereas in our
experiments, we implement continuous signals, where
trustees can decide how much they want to spend on a
signal. However, irrespective of whether the signal is
binary or continuous, in a separating equilibrium, the
long-term trustee sends a signal at a cost c, where
R/(1 – l) – P> c >T – P, whereas the short-term trustee
does not send a signal, and the truster places trust after
signalling and withholds trust otherwise. We hypothesize
that if <*, the strategies in the separating equilibrium
are the basis for subjects’ behaviour in our experiments.
Thus, if at all, long-term trustees will be more likely to
Figure 3 In the signalling trust game too, first Nature (N) determines the trustee’s type, but before the truster decides
whether or not to place trust, the trustee decides whether or not to send a signal. The signal is associated with a cost c for the
trustee and this cost is incurred first and irrespectively of what the truster and the trustee do thereafter. Before the truster
decides whether or not to place trust, they observe the trustee’s signalling decision.
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deviate from equilibrium signalling from ‘above’ (i.e.,
c0 <T – P), whereas short-term trustees will be more
likely to deviate from ‘below’ (i.e., c0 > 0). Hence, if
trusters observe out-of-equilibrium signalling, they may
still infer that signals on which higher amounts have
been spent are more likely to be from long-term types
than from short-term types.
Our first set of hypotheses suggests that long-term
trustees spend higher amounts on signals than short-term
trustees, but only if trusters do not have an incentive to
unconditionally place trust (i.e., if <*). If >*, we
expect to observe type-pooling signalling behaviour.
H1a: If <*, the amount spent on a signal by a
long-term trustee will be higher than the amount spent
by a short-term trustee.
H1b: If > *, the amount spent on a signal by a
long-term trustee will be the same as the amount spent
by a short-term trustee.
H1c: The short-term trustee’s amount spent on a signal
will not differ according to the relation between  and *.
Our second and central set of hypotheses concerns the
proportion of trusters placing trust conditional on the
signalling opportunity and the amount spent on a signal
by the trustee. We hypothesize that a signalling oppor-
tunity will increase the level of trust, but only if the
trusters do not have an incentive to unconditionally
place trust (i.e., if < *), and that trusters’ decisions to
trust will be affected by the amount spent on the signal
by the trustees.
H2a: If  < *, the proportion of trusters placing trust
will be higher in a game with a signalling opportunity
than in a game without a signalling opportunity.
H2b: If  > *, the proportion of trusters placing trust
will be the same in a game with a signalling opportunity
as in a game without a signalling opportunity.
H2c: Irrespective of the signalling opportunity, the
proportion of trusters placing trust will be lowest if
 < * and highest if  > *.
H2d: The higher the amount spent on a signal by the
trustee is, the higher will be the proportion of trusters
placing trust.
Finally, we expect long-term trustees to be more
trustworthy than short-term trustees:
H3: For both conditions < * and >*, the pro-
portion of long-term trustees honouring trust will be
higher than the proportion of short-term trustees
honouring trust.
Experimental Procedure and
Design
In total, we conducted four similar computerized
experiments; these took place in the United Kingdom
(Oxford, Experiment 1), Russia (Nizhny Novgorod,
Experiment 2), and Switzerland (Zurich, Experiments 3
and 4) using student populations there.5 The findings
were surprisingly robust across countries and experi-
ments. The most extended experiment was conducted in
Oxford, and we report the design and the results from
this experiment here. We report the design and the
results from the other three experiments in the online
Supplementary Data 2.
In each experimental session, subjects were randomly
assigned to be a truster or a trustee and kept their roles
throughout the session. In accordance with the trust
game, a truster could choose between action t (trust) and
action :t (no trust), and only if the truster decided in
favour of action t could the trustee choose between
action h (honour trust) and action :h (abuse trust).
Payoffs were set to T¼ 20MU, R¼ 10MU, P¼ 5MU,
and S¼10MU, where 5MU (monetary units) corres-
ponded to £1. Trusters and trustees were endowed with
20MU each at the beginning of every interaction.
Moreover, trustees could be either short term or long
term. The discount factors of short-term and long-term
trustees were set to s¼ 0 and l¼ 0.667, respectively,
and the expected possible number of games per inter-
action with either trustee type was derived from the
discount factors. Subjects were told that an interaction
with a short-term trustee consisted of only one game and
that an interaction with a long-term trustee consisted of
three repeated games on average, but that a game could
be repeated only if the truster chose t and the long-term
trustee chose h. Subjects were not told that in an
interaction with a long-term trustee the minimum
possible number of games was two and the maximum
was four and that the possible number of games of two,
three, or four had been predetermined by the
experimenters.
While in every interaction a trustee was told whether
he or she was short term or long term, a truster only
knew that the proportion of interactions with a
long-term trustee was  and the proportion of inter-
actions with a short-term trustee was 1 – . In each
experimental session,  was either low (¼ 0.25) or high
(¼ 0.50) and therefore was either below or above
the threshold * of 0.375 (see Equation 3).
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Moreover, subjects were told that the experiment
consisted of two parts and that they would only learn
at the end of the first part what the second part was
about. The signalling opportunity was either introduced
in the first part and was absent in the second part, or it
was the other way around. In the part with a signalling
opportunity, at the beginning of every interaction, a
trustee could give up part of his or her endowment to
send a card to the truster. The trustee could choose from
11 different cards, with each card having a different
price, ranging from 0 to 20 MU. The truster received the
card the trustee had chosen and was informed about the
expenditure the trustee had made. Next, the truster
could make his or her choice in the first trust game of
the interaction. The threshold (c*¼T – P) above which a
card was affordable by a long-term trustee only was
15MU (see Equation 4). In the part without a signalling
opportunity, a trustee could not send any cards to the
truster. Table 1 describes our experimental design in
more detail.
Throughout the experiment, subjects interacted with
alternating participants. Although every truster was
paired with every trustee at most three times, subjects
did not know who they were paired with in any of the
interactions and were paired with the same participants
at irregular intervals.
The subjects were 172 students and university em-
ployees (53% female, average age: 29.0, sd¼ 10.3). At the
beginning of each session, subjects were given written
instructions on paper. The instructions were neutrally
phrased and are reproduced in the online Supplementary
Data 2. After they had read these to themselves, they
took a quiz about the instructions, and the correct
answers were explained orally to all subjects. Subjects
were allowed to refer to the instruction sheets through-
out the experiment. Then, the experiment was con-
ducted. After the experiment, participants were asked to
fill out a questionnaire and received the money they had
earned in the experiment. An experimental session lasted
for about 90min and subjects earned £15 on average
(E17 or sFr. 25), including a participation fee of £4.
Results
We present the results for each stage of the signalling
trust game separately. The test statistics referred to in
this section, and the graphs in Figure 4 are based on the
regression model estimations presented in Table A1 in
the appendix. Statistical significance is set at the 5% level
for two-sided tests, and we account for the repeated
measures obtained on the same subject by estimating
cluster-robust standard errors.
Trustees’ Signalling Behaviour
Figure 4a shows that long-term trustees spend signifi-
cantly higher amounts on signals than short-term
trustees, which is the case in both the low-alpha (H1a:
F1,85¼ 37.48, P<0.001) and the high-alpha condition
(H1b: F1,85¼ 8.23, P¼ 0.005). While we expected
long-term trustees to send costlier signals to distinguish
themselves from short-term trustees in the low-alpha
condition, we did not expect such behaviour in the high-
alpha condition. However, the difference in the low-alpha
condition is significantly larger than in the high-alpha
condition (F1,85¼ 11.05, P¼ 0.001), indicating that sig-
nalling behaviour is more type-separating in the former
than in the latter. In line with hypothesis H1c, the
average amount short-term trustees spend on signals in
the low-alpha condition does not differ from the amount
they spend in the high-alpha condition (H1c: F1,85¼ 0.42,
P¼ 0.518). But how do trusters act on the signals that
trustees send? In particular, do trusters place more trust
the more trustees spend on signals? Moreover, does a
signalling opportunity increase the overall level of trust as
compared with a condition where no such opportunity
exists? We try to answer these questions next.
Table 1. Experimental Design
Proportion of long-term trustees
Low-alpha (¼ 0.25) High-alpha (¼ 0.50)
No signalling first; signalling second Sequence of 2 12 interactions Sequence of 2 10 interactions
Signalling first; no signalling second Sequence of 2 12 interactions Sequence of 2 10 interactions
We implemented a 2 (low-alpha vs. high-alpha) 2 (signalling versus no signalling) factorial design. In the low-alpha condition, ¼ 0.25 was below the
critical threshold value *¼ 0.375. In the high-alpha condition, ¼ 0.5 was above the critical threshold value. Moreover, the experiment consisted of two
parts, each part lasting for 12 or 10 interactions, where ¼ 0.25 (i.e., 4/12) or ¼ 0.5 (i.e., 5/10), respectively. We varied  between subject and whether the
trustee had a signalling opportunity within subject. That is, each experimental session was conducted with  being either low or high, and the signalling
opportunity was introduced either in the first or in the second part. In four experimental sessions, the signalling opportunity was introduced in the first part
and in the other four sessions in the second part.
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Trusters’ Trust
Figure 4b shows the proportion of trusters placing trust
in the low-alpha and the high-alpha condition both with
and without a signalling opportunity. Contrary to our
expectations, a signalling opportunity does not increase
the overall level of trust in the low-alpha condition (H2a:
2ð1Þ ¼ 0.45, P¼ 0.501) and even decreases trust in the
high-alpha condition (H2b: 2ð1Þ ¼ 8.99, P¼ 0.003). In
line with hypothesis H2c, we observe a significantly
higher level of trust in the high-alpha condition than in
the low-alpha condition (H2c: 2ð1Þ ¼ 13.74, P<0.001).
Evidently, without a signalling opportunity, trusters
respond to the incentives in the two alpha conditions
as expected, but once a signalling opportunity is
introduced, their behaviour leads to unexpected out-
comes. However, Figure 4c reveals that, in line with our
expectations, the more a trustee spends on the signal, the
higher is the proportion of trusters placing trust (H2d:
z¼ 4.02, P<0.001). So how is it that the overall level of
trust does not increase or even decreases once trustees
are given the opportunity to communicate their type?
The answer to this question becomes apparent with a
closer look at Figure 4c. In both alpha conditions, if
trustees send cheap signals (e.g., 0MU), the proportion
of trusters placing trust falls below the proportion
Figure 4 Main results of Experiment 1. Figures (a) through (d) are based on the regression model estimations that are listed
and explained in Table A1 in the appendix. Panel (a) shows the average amounts spent by short-term and long-term trustees
on signals in the low-alpha and the high-alpha condition. Long-term trustees spend significantly higher amounts on signals
than short-term trustees, but this difference is significantly smaller in the high-alpha condition. Panel (b) shows the proportion
of trusters’ trusting decisions in the low-alpha and the high-alpha condition, both with and without a signalling opportunity.
The overall level of trust does not increase with a signalling opportunity and even decreases in the high-alpha condition.
However, the plot in panel (c) shows that the higher the amount a trustee spends on the signal, the higher is the proportion of
trusters’ trusting decisions in both the low-alpha and the high-alpha condition. Panel (d) shows short-term and long-term
trustees’ levels of trustworthiness. Long-term trustees are substantially more trustworthy than short-term trustees across all
experimental conditions.
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observed without a signalling opportunity. In other
words, cheap signals induce distrust and trustees have to
pay to be trusted to the same extent as they are trusted
in the condition without signalling. Based on a rough
extrapolation, one can imagine what the outcome would
be if the level of unconditional trust decreased by
another 30 percentage points while trusters’ responsive-
ness to trustees’ signals (i.e., the slope coefficient of the
amount spent on the signal) stayed the same. In such a
case, it is likely that the overall level of trust induced by
trustees’ signals would be higher than the trust level
without a signalling opportunity. In fact, the low-alpha
condition was supposed to induce the level of uncon-
ditional trust at zero, but the subjects who participated
in our experiment did not behave in the way our game
theoretic model would imply.
Trustees’ Trustworthiness
In line with our expectations, we find that the propor-
tion of long-term trustees honouring trust is significantly
higher than the proportion of short-term trustees
honouring trust (H3: 2ð1Þ ¼ 23.16, P< 0.001). Across all
experimental conditions, the level of long-term trustees’
trustworthiness is between 82% and 93%, while it is
between 33% and 41% for short-term trustees. The latter
clearly indicates that a considerable proportion of
short-term trustees act in a non-selfish way, resulting
in placed trust being honoured more often than we had
expected. It is therefore plausible that trusters placed
trust because they acted on their non-zero beliefs about
short-term trustees’ trustworthiness and these beliefs
were reinforced by their positive experience several
rounds into the experiment.
Based on these findings, we may conclude that, if the
level of unconditional trust is high, the introduction of a
signalling opportunity does not further increase that
level and could even decrease it, as sending cheap signals
will cause distrust. However, at least in the low-alpha
condition, the signalling opportunity may still increase
collective gains as it allows trusters to distinguish
long-term and short-term trustees by their signalling
behaviour and to engage in mutually beneficial repeated
interactions with long-term trustees only.
Collective Gains
Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix list trusters’ and
trustees’ expected payoffs, respectively, in each of the
four experimental conditions, and explain how these
numbers are calculated. It turns out that in the
low-alpha condition with a signalling opportunity, the
proportion of trust towards long-term trustees is 34%
and significantly different from the marginal distribution
of 25% (2ð1Þ ¼ 10.21, P¼ 0.001). This difference is small
(51–50%) and insignificant in the high-alpha condition.
Also, it appears that in the low-alpha condition, an
average truster does slightly better with a signalling
opportunity (5.48MU) than without (4.95MU), and
that trusting conditional on trustees’ signalling behaviour
pays off (6.46 > 5MU) while trusting unconditionally
does not (4.87 < 5MU). In the high-alpha condition,
trusting clearly pays off, even without a signalling
opportunity (10.05 > 5 MU), and introducing a signalling
opportunity increases these benefits (11.28 > 5MU).
Although an average trustee earns considerably more
than an average truster and a long-term trustee earns
more than a short-term trustee, introducing a signalling
opportunity reduces trustees’ benefits by 3.20MU in the
low-alpha condition and by 6.15MU in the high-alpha
condition. This roughly corresponds to what trustees
have to spend on signals in the low-alpha and the
high-alpha condition, respectively, to be trusted to the
same extent as they are trusted without a signalling
opportunity (see Figure 4c). Hence, in our experiment,
trusters win and trustees lose while collective gains
decrease when a signalling opportunity is introduced.
Switzerland and Russia
We conducted three further experiments in Switzerland
and Russia. Unlike in the UK experiment described here,
in these other experiments, we only implemented the
low-alpha condition (i.e., <*) and compared the
conditions with and without a signalling opportunity in
a between-subject design. Results from these experiments
are very much in line with the findings presented and
discussed here. In particular, the hypothesis of a
trust-enhancing effect of the signalling opportunity was
not confirmed in any of the three experiments.
Furthermore, the short-term and long-term trustees’
signalling behaviour and trustworthiness were in accord-
ance with our hypotheses. The results of these experi-
ments are presented and discussed in more detail in the
online Supplementary Data 2.
Discussion and Conclusions
Signalling theory captures social interactions in terms of
the information conveyed in the behaviour or other
observable characteristics of interacting agents. It starts
from the assumption that agents are endowed with
different sets of information about each other’s prefer-
ences and constraints. While agents’ preferences and
constraints are not observable, agents would benefit from
accurate information about them. Posner (1998, 2000)
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suggests that seemingly irrational behaviour or social
norms emerge because they help to distinguish agents
who prefer to engage in repeated cooperative interactions
(long-term types) from agents with immediate
non-cooperative incentives (short-term types).
In this article, we formalized Posner’s idea in a
signalling trust game with incomplete information and
tested hypotheses derived from our model in a series of
laboratory experiments. The variables used in the
experiments were the probability of encountering a
long-term trustee (low-alpha vs. high-alpha) and trus-
tees’ possibility of sending costly signals (no signalling
opportunity vs. signalling opportunity). Subjects were
randomly assigned to be trusters or trustees and trustees
could be either short term or long term. Trusters only
knew the probability of being paired with either trustee
type. Interactions with long-term trustees consisted of
repeated games; these consisted of three games on
average. Interactions with short-term trustees were
one-shot games.
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, long-term
trustees spent significantly higher amounts on signals
than short-term trustees (H1a), the proportion of
trusters’ placing trust was higher in the high-alpha
condition than in the low-alpha condition (H2c), the
proportion increased with the amount a trustee spent on
a signal (H2d), and long-term trustees honoured trust
significantly more often than short-term trustees (H3).
Although the experimental data are in accordance with
most of our hypotheses, the core hypothesis of our
signalling model (H2b) was not corroborated. Contrary
to our expectations, a signalling opportunity did not
enhance the level of trust in the low-alpha condition and
even decreased it in the high-alpha condition.
In our analysis of the experimental data, we show that
a likely cause for the lack of support for H2b is the
considerable proportion of short-term trustees honour-
ing trust, presumably because of non-selfish motives. If
the a priori level of trustworthiness is high (i.e., > *),
trusters have a real incentive to unconditionally place
trust in the low-alpha condition without a signalling
opportunity. Thus, a signalling opportunity that is
supposed to increase the trust level from zero to
¼ 0.25, once introduced, may not exhibit the
trust-enhancing effect relative to the actually existing
level of 36%. What is more, in the high-alpha condition,
where the level of unconditional trust is supposed to be
100%, the introduction of a signalling opportunity may
cause the trust level to decrease if type-separating rather
than type-pooling signalling behaviour emerges. That is,
if long-term trustees start distinguishing themselves from
short-term trustees by sending costly signals, cheap
signals may induce distrust, as they will be expected to
come from short-term types and, as a result, the level of
trust will decrease. The fact that we find type-separating
signalling behaviour in both alpha conditions, albeit to a
significantly lower extent in the high-alpha condition,
suggests that type-separating signalling can emerge more
gradually and that the degree of type distinction it
exhibits may depend on the actual level of uncertainty
about trustees’ trustworthiness. In other words, the less
trusters are willing to place trust unconditionally, the
more long-term trustees are willing to spend on costly
signals to distinguish themselves from short-term types.
Finally, we observed that the introduction of a signalling
opportunity in both the low-alpha and the high-alpha
condition slightly increased trusters’ expected payoffs
while it considerably decreased trustees’ expected payoffs,
resulting in a net loss in collective gains. However, it
remains an open question as to how far a signalling
system in which trustees’ signals are broadcast to more
than one truster (e.g., through the internet or at public
events) would increase collective gains without increasing
the level of trust.
What do these findings tell us about Posner’s
signalling theory in general and our signalling model in
particular? Obviously, Posner’s signalling theory has
inspired our thinking about social cooperation and has
led us to suggest a formalized version of it in this article.
Such formalization will, we believe, ultimately allow us
to explain seemingly irrational (signalling) behaviour in
human social interaction and to predict under what
conditions it is likely to emerge. However, before we can
get to the latter, we need to reconsider the way in which
we implemented our experiments to test the predictions
from our model.
Note first that most of our hypotheses are supported
by our findings and the results that are not in line with
our hypotheses can be plausibly explained within the
scope of the model. This may sound contradictory, but
in fact it is not. The signalling trust game that we
devised for this article assumes—but does not require—
actors to be self-interested. Thus, the fact that in our
experiment a high proportion of short-term trustees
honoured trust for non-selfish reasons changes the
conditions under which we put our model to a test,
but it does not invalidate our model. However, there are
several aspects of the implementation of our experiments
that could be improved in future research. In particular,
the a priori level of trustworthiness of short-term trustees
could be decreased by a decrease in the monetary
incentives for honouring trust in the one-shot trust
game. At the same time, this would reduce trusters’
beliefs about short-term trustees’ trustworthiness and
bring down a priori trust to a level that has the potential
to be increased by a signalling opportunity. However, the
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problem with this approach is that a change in subjects’
monetary incentives also changes the parameter values of
our model, which still assumes self-interested actors. In
other words, the model makes new predictions as a
result of the change in payoffs, whereas our aim in
changing the payoffs is to obtain the conditions under
which the old predictions can be tested. The easiest way
out of this dilemma would be to use deception, i.e., let
subjects interact with trusters and trustees who are
programmed to behave in a rational and selfish way
while making them believe that they are interacting with
human subjects. This approach, however, is controver-
sial, mostly because it is believed that experimental
subjects, once they learn that deception is being used,
will also believe that it is being used even if it is not.
Ironically, these subjects’ wrong beliefs may then distort
the experimental conditions one attempts to create to
test a particular hypothesis.6
In our attempt to implement the experimentum crucis
without using deception, we have learned something
interesting about actual human behaviour and the
functioning of a signalling system. In particular, we
have learned that if a priori levels of trust and
trustworthiness are high, introducing a signalling op-
portunity that is meant to distinguish long-term and
short-term types may have a counterproductive effect.
Therefore, we suppose that the predictions of Posner’s
theory crucially depend on the a priori levels of trust and
trustworthiness and that a signalling opportunity will
increase individual and collective gains if these levels are
low. This tells us that the existing levels of trust and
trustworthiness are important contextual variables that
must be accounted for if one wants to study the
emergence of signalling behaviour in the field. Finally,
the fact that we do not find major differences across
three countries tells us that cultural differences may be
unimportant in explaining subjects’ behaviour in experi-
mental signalling trust games.
Notes
1. Both interpretations are in line with Posner’s
theoretical ideas (see e.g., Rasmusen, 2001, chapter
5). However, here we adhere to the former inter-
pretation, as it allows us to take a sociological
perspective and to manipulate the discount factor
experimentally.
2. The present value of the reward from repeated
cooperation is R/(1 )¼Rþ Rþ 2Rþ 3Rþ . . .
3. This assumption is similar to assuming that in an
infinitely repeated trust game, the truster and the
trustee use a so-called trigger strategy, which starts
defecting forever once the other party abstains from
cooperation (see e.g., Osborne, 2004, chapter 14). In
our model, we additionally assume that only mutual
cooperation can go on forever, but not mutual
defection. We make this assumption because it
makes our model more comprehensible. In Footnote
1 in the online Supplementary Data 1, we show that
the qualitative model predictions are unaffected by
the latter assumption.
4. Coleman (1990: 99) introduces a similar decision
threshold in his chapter on trust relations. His
formalization of the trust problem, however, does
not account for the strategic nature of the decision
situation (see also Voss, 1998).
5. All experiments were programmed and conducted
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The
data from all experiments will be made available on
the authors’ home pages.
6. In fact, we conducted an experiment in which
subjects in the role of trusters interacted with
computer-simulated trustees in a long sequence of
interactions. However, we did not use deception; we
informed subjects that they would interact with
simulated trustees and not with a real person. In
this experiment, short-term trustees were pro-
grammed to always abuse the truster’s trust, and
long-term trustees were programmed to always
honour that trust. Moreover, in the condition with
a signalling opportunity, trustees’ signalling behav-
iour was noisy but obviously correlated with their
type. Although it took trusters some time to learn to
respond optimally, the results of this experiment are
consistent with our conjecture that the introduction
of a signalling opportunity increases trust if the
a priori level of trustworthiness is low (see
Przepiorka, 2009: 79–86).
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Appendix
Table A1. Regression model estimations
(a) Trustee
spent on
signal (in MU)
(b) Truster placed
trust (0/1)
(c) Truster placed
trust (0/1)
(d) Trustee
honoured
trust (0/1)
OLS Logit 1 Logit 2 Logit 3
Trustee type [short-term (ref.), long-term]
Long-term 3.736*** (0.610) 2.918*** (0.606)
Alpha condition [¼ 0.25 (ref.), ¼ 0.50]
¼ 0.50 0.428 (0.659) 1.268*** (0.342) 1.268*** (0.342) 0.103 (0.375)
Signalling opportunity [no signal (ref.), signal]
Signal 0.138 (0.205) 0.555* (0.236) 0.353 (0.258)
Amount spent on signal (0–20 MU)
Amount 0.128*** (0.032)
Two-way interactions
Long-term¼ 0.50 2.490** (0.749) 0.944 (0.718)
Long-term signal 0.072 (0.601)
¼ 0.50 Signal 0.539 (0.305) 0.518 (0.351) 0.159 (0.364)
¼ 0.50 amount 0.009 (0.047)
Three-way interaction
Long-term¼ 0.50 Signal 0.768 (0.783)
const. 2.047*** (0.410) 0.582* (0.236) 0.582* (0.236) 0.353 (0.266)
N1 946 1892 1892 856
N2 86 86 86 86
adj. R2 0.07
pseudo R2 0.05 0.08 0.20
2 20.43 46.03 80.75
Notes: The table lists coefficient estimates from OLS and logistic regression models with cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (***P < 0.001, **P < 0.01,
*P < 0.05 for two-sided tests). The dependent variable in Model (a) is the amount spent on a signal by a trustee. The binary dependent variable in Models (b)
and (c) is 1 if the truster placed trust and the binary dependent variable in Model (d) is 1 if the trustee honoured trust. The graphs shown in Figures 4a–d
are based on these respective model estimations. While Figures 4a–d are based on variants of the respective models estimated without a constant and a full set
of interaction terms, Figure 4c shows predicted trust levels for different amounts spent on the signal by a trustee in each experimental condition. These
predictions are based on Model (c).
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Table A2. Trusters’ expected payoffs
Low-alpha Without signalling opportunity With signalling opportunity
t (0.36) :t (0.64) t (0.33) :t (0.67)
Short-term (0.77) Long-term (0.23) – Short-term (0.66) Long-term (0.34) –
h (0.41) :h (0.59) h (0.93) :h (0.07) – h (0.33) :h (0.67) h (0.89) :h (0.11) –
Payoff 10 10 30 10 5 10 10 30 10 5
Expected 1.14 1.64 2.31 0.06 3.20 0.72 1.46 3.00 0.12 3.35
4.95 (total); 4.87 (t); 5.00 (:t) 5.48 (total); 6.46 (t); 5.00 (:t)
High-alpha Without signalling opportunity With signalling opportunity
t (0.67) :t (0.33) t (0.50) :t (0.50)
Short-term (0.51) Long-term (0.49) – Short-term (0.49) Long-term (0.51) –
h (0.39) :h (0.61) h (0.82) :h (0.18) – h (0.34) :h (0.66) h (0.88) :h (0.12) –
Payoff 10 10 30 10 5 10 10 30 10 5
Expected 1.33 2.08 8.08 0.59 1.65 0.83 1.62 6.73 0.31 2.50
8.38 (total); 10.05 (t); 5.00 (:t) 8.14 (total); 11.28 (t); 5.00 (:t)
Notes: The table lists the proportions of trusters’ trusting decisions (t) and the proportions of short-term and long-term trustees’ decisions to honour placed
trust (h) in each of the four experimental conditions. Based on these proportions and the payoffs of the trust game, trusters’ (total) expected payoffs as well as
their expected payoffs from placing trust (t) and not placing trust (:t) are calculated. For example, the expected value of the path [t, short-term, :h] in the
low-alpha condition with signalling opportunity is 0.33 0.66 0.67 ( 10)¼1.46. The sums of the corresponding values are listed at the bottom of each
of the four sub-tables. Note that it is assumed that an interaction with a long-term trustee who honours placed trust in the first game lasts for three games
and therefore yields a payoff of 30 MU for the truster.
Table A3. Trustees’ expected payoffs
Low-alpha Without signalling opportunity With signalling opportunity
Short-term (0.75) Long-term (0.25) Short-term (0.75) Long-term (0.25)
t0 (0.37) :t0 (0.63) t0 (0.33) :t0 (0.67) t0 (0.29) :t0 (0.71) t0 (0.44) :t0 (0.56)
Payoff 20 5 30 5 20 5 30 5
Expected 5.55 2.36 2.48 0.84 4.35 2.66 3.30 0.70
11.23 (total); 10.55 (s); 13.25 (l) 8.03 (total); 7.30 (s); 10.22 (l)
High-alpha Without signalling opportunity With signalling opportunity
Short-term (0.50) Long-term (0.50) Short-term (0.50) Long-term (0.50)
t0 (0.68) :t0 (0.32) t0 (0.65) :t0 (0.35) t0 (0.49) :t0 (0.51) t0 (0.52) :t0 (0.48)
Payoff 20 5 30 5 20 5 30 5
Expected 6.80 0.80 9.75 0.88 4.90 1.28 7.80 1.20
18.23 (total); 15.20 (s); 21.25 (l) 12.08 (total); 9.88 (s); 14.28 (l)
Notes: The table lists the proportions of short-term and long-term trustees that have been trusted (t0) or not trusted (:t0) in each of the four experimental
conditions. Based on these proportions and the payoffs of the trust game, trustees’ (total) expected payoffs as well as the expected payoffs of short-term (s) and
long-term trustees (l) are calculated. For example, the expected value of the path [short-term, :t0] in the low-alpha condition with signalling opportunity is
0.75 0.71 (5)¼ 2.66. The sums of the corresponding values are listed at the bottom of each of the four sub-tables. Note that in the conditions with a
signalling opportunity, the average amounts spent on signals have been subtracted. The average amounts spent on signals are 2.98MU (total), 2.05MU (s),
and 5.78MU (l) in the low-alpha condition and 3.10MU (total), 2.47MU (s), and 3.72 MU (l) in the high-alpha condition (see Figure 4a). Finally, note
that it is assumed that a short-term trustee does not honour trust and therefore earns 20MU, whereas a long-term trustee honours trust in three consecutive
games and therefore earns 30MU.
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